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Abstract. Performance of cryptanalytic quantum search algorithms is
mainly inferred from query complexity which hides overhead induced by
an implementation. To shed light on quantitative complexity analysis
removing hidden factors, we provide a framework for estimating time-
space complexity, with carefully accounting for characteristics of target
cryptographic functions. Processor and circuit parallelization methods
are taken into account, resulting in the time-space trade-offs curves in
terms of depth and qubit. The method guides how to rank different cir-
cuit designs in order of their efficiency. The framework is applied to
representative cryptosystems NIST referred to as a guideline for security
parameters, reassessing the security strengths of AES and SHA-2.
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography (PQC), Circuit model, Grover,
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1 Introduction
Quantum cryptanalysis is an area of study that has long been developed along-
side the field of quantum computing, as many cryptosystems are expected to be
directly affected by quantum algorithms. One of the quantum algorithms that
would have an impact on symmetric cryptosystems is Grover’s algorithm [28].
It had been widely known that many symmetric cryptosystem’s security lev-
els will be simply reduced by half due to the asymptotic behavior of the query
complexity of Grover’s algorithm under the oracle assumption. As the field has
matured over decades, not mere asymptotic but more quantitative approaches to
the cryptanalysis are also being considered recently [4,27,43,46,47]. These works
have substantially improved the understanding of quantum attacks by systemat-
ically estimating quantum resources. Nevertheless, it is still noticeable that the
existing works on resource estimates are more intended for suggesting exemplary
quantum circuits (so that one can count the number of required gates and qubits
explicitly) than fine-tuning of actual attack designs.
The importance of estimating costs of quantum search algorithms beyond
pioneering works should be emphasized as it can be utilized to suggest prac-
tical security levels in the post-quantum era. NIST indeed suggested security
levels based on the resistances of AES and SHA to quantum attacks in the PQC
standardization call for proposals document [41]. In addition, the difficulty of
measuring the complexity of quantum attacks was questioned in the first NIST
PQC standardization workshop [37]. The main purpose of this work is to formu-
late the time-space complexity of quantum search algorithm in order to provide
reliable quantum security strengths of classical symmetric cryptosystems.
1.1 This work
There exist two noteworthy points overlooked in the previous works. First, the
target function to be inverted is generally a pseudo-random function or a crypto-
graphic hash function. Under the characteristics of such functions, bijective cor-
respondence between input and output is not guaranteed. This makes Grover’s
algorithm seemingly inadequate due to the unpredictability of the number of
targets. The second point is time-space trade-offs of quantum resources. Earlier
works on quantitative resource estimates have implicitly or explicitly assumed
a single quantum processor. Presuming that the resource in classical estimates
includes the number of processors the adversary is equipped with, the single
processor assumption is something that should be revised.
Being aware of the issues, we come up with a framework for analyzing the
time-space complexity of cryptanalytic quantum search algorithms. The main
consequences we presented in this paper are three folded:
Precise query complexity involving parallelization. The number of oracle
queries, or equivalently Grover iterations, is first estimated as exactly as possible,
reasonably accounting for previously overlooked points. Random statistics of the
target function are carefully handled which lead to increase in iteration num-
ber compared with the case of unique target. Surprisingly, however, the cost of
dealing with random statistics in this paper is not expensive compared with the
previous work [27] under single processor assumption. Furthermore, when pro-
cessor parallelization is considered, we observed that this extra cost gets even
more negligible. It is also interesting to recognize that the parallelization meth-
ods could vary depending on the search problems. After taking the asymptotical
big O notation off, the relation between time and space in terms of Grover itera-
tions and number of processors, called trade-offs curve, is obtained. Apart from
resource estimates, investigating the trade-offs curve of state-of-the-art collision
algorithm in [18] with optimized parameters is one of our major concerns.
Qubit-depth trade-offs and circuit design tuning. In the next stage, time
and space resources are defined in a way that they can be interpreted as phys-
ical quantities. Cost of quantum circuits for cryptanalytic algorithms can be
estimated in units of logical qubits and Toffoli-depths. Taking the total number
of gates as time complexity disturbs accurate estimates for the speed of quan-
tum algorithms due to far different overheads introduced by various gates in real
operation. With the definitions of quantum resources, the trade-offs curve now
describes the relation between number of qubits and circuit depths. Since we are
given a ‘relation’ between time and space, it is then possible to grade the various
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quantum circuits in order of efficiency. In other words, the method described so
far enables one to tell which attack design is more cost-effective.
By applying generic methodology newly introduced, time-space complexities
of AES and SHA-2 against quantum attacks are measured in the following way.
Various designs are constructed by assembling different circuit components with
options such as reduced depth at the cost of the increase in qubits (or vice versa).
Design candidates are then subjected to the trade-offs relation for comparison.
The trade-offs coefficient of the most efficient design represents the hardness
of quantum cryptanalysis. Compared with pre-existing circuit designs, we have
improved the circuits by reducing required qubits and/or depths in various ways.
However, we do not claim that we have found the optimal attacks for AES and
SHA-2. The method enables us to select the ‘best’ one out of candidates at
hand. It is remarked that the explicit circuit designs for quantum collision search
algorithms is first introduced.
Revisiting the security levels of NIST PQC standardization. The pro-
cedure is applied to each primitive of security strength categories NIST specified
in [41]. A new threshold that is required for the category classification, based
on the cost metric proposed in this work, is provided in Fig. 1. It includes wide
range of parameters and the quantum collision finding algorithms which do not
outperform classical counterparts to explicitly recognize the quantum-side com-
plexities of all the categories.
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Fig. 1. Time-space cost, which has conditional ordering, of the quantum attacks on
five security strength category representatives of NIST PQC standardization
We end this subsection with an important caveat. Use of classical resources
appears in this paper, but we do not handle the complexity induced by it because
of unclear comparison criteria for quantum and classical resources.
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1.2 Organization
Next section covers the backgrounds including Grover’s algorithm and its vari-
ants. In Sect. 3, the time-space complexity of relevant algorithms in a unit of
Grover iteration is investigated. A basic unit of quantum computation is pro-
posed in Sect. 4. Sections 5, 6 and 7 show the results of applying the time-space
analysis to AES and SHA-2. In Sect. 8, based on the observations made in the
previous sections, a comprehensive figure summarizing the quantum security
strengths of AES and SHA-2 is drawn. Section 9 summarizes the paper.
2 Backgrounds
Grover’s algorithm, the success probability, parallelization methods, and some
generalizations or variants are explained briefly. A breif review of AES and SHA-
2, and an introduction to related works on resource estimates are followed. We
do not cover the basics of quantum computing, but leave the references [7,38]
for interested readers. In this paper, every bra or ket state is normalized.
2.1 Grover’s Algorithm
Throughout the paper, the target function is denoted by f and N = 2n for some
n ∈ N. Consider a set X of size N and a function f : X → {0, 1},
f(x) =
{
1 , if x ∈ T ,
0 , otherwise ,
where T of size t is a set of targets to be found.
Grover’s algorithm [28] is an algorithm that repeatedly applies an operator
Q = −AS0A−1Sf , called Grover iteration, to the initial state |Ψ〉 = A|0〉, where
A = H⊗n , S0 = I − 2|0〉〈0| , Sf = I − 2|τ〉〈τ | , (1)
where H⊗n is a set of Hadamard operators and |τ〉 is a target state which is an
equal-phase and equal-weight superposition of |x〉 for all x ∈ T . The roles of S0
and Sf are to swap the sign of zero and |τ〉 states, respectively.
The operators Sf and −AS0A−1 are known as oracle and diffusion operators,
respectively. By acting the oracle operator on a state, only the target state is
marked through the sign change. The diffusion operator flips amplitudes around
the average.
Success probability of measurement as a function of the number of iterations
has been studied in [13], observing the optimal number of iterations that mini-
mizes the ratio of the iterations to success rate. We introduce the results below
with notation that is used throughout the paper.
By applying Q on the initial state i-times, the success probability of measur-
ing one of the t solutions in the domain of size N , denoted by pt,N (i), becomes
pt,N (i) = sin
2 [(2i+ 1)θt,N ] , (2)
4
where sin (θt,N ) =
√
t/N (= 〈Ψ |τ〉). The number of repetitions of Q maximizing
the success probability of measurement, denoted by Impt,N , is estimated as
Impt,N = (pi/4) ·
√
N/t .1 (3)
When the measurement is made after i-repetitions of Q, the expected number
of Grover iterations to find one of the targets can be expressed as a function of
i. For t targets in the domain of size N , the function is denoted by It,N (i) which
reads It,N (i) = i/pt,N(i). The optimal number of iterations it,N that minimizes
i/pt,N(i) is found to be it,N = 0.583 . . . ·
√
N/t, and then the expected number
of iterations, denoted by It,N reads
It,N = It,N (it,N ) = 0.690 . . . ·
√
N/t . (4)
In some cases where the domain size is N , it is omitted such as pt(i)(= pt,N(i))
or It(= It,N ), for readability.
Parallelization of Grover’s algorithm using multiple quantum computers has
been investigated in applications to cryptanalysis [8,41,53]. Consideration of par-
allelization in an hybrid algorithm can be found in [9]. Asymptotically the exe-
cution time is reduced by a factor of the square root of the number of quantum
computers. There are two straightforward parallelization methods having such
property, called inner and outer parallelization.
Here we fix some notations for parameters related to parallelization. Tq and
Sq stand for the number of sequential Grover iterations and the number of
quantum computers, respectively. Sc stands for the amount of classical resources,
such as the size of storage and/or the number of processors. Definitions of two
parallelization methods can be given as follows.
Definition 1 (Inner Parallelization (IP)). After dividing the entire search
space into Sq disjoint sets, each machine searches one of the Sq sets for the
target. The number of iterations can be reduced due to the smaller domain size.
Definition 2 (Outer Parallelization (OP)). Copies of Grover’s algorithm
on the entire search space is executed in Sq machines. Since it is successful if
any of Sq machines finds the target, the number of iterations can be reduced.
Parallelization is inevitable once the notion of MAXDEPTH [41] is applied.
2.2 Generalizations and Variants
Fixed-point [52] and quantum amplitude amplification (QAA) [14] algorithms
are generalizations of Grover’s algorithm. A brief review of QAA is given in
this subsection which appears as a component of a collision finding algorithm
1 Rounding function is not explicitly used in this paper for simplicity.
5
in later sections. We skip over the fixed-point algorithm as it has no advantage
over Grover’s algorithm and QAA in this work.2
There exist a number of variants of Grover’s algorithm in application to col-
lision finding. In [15], Brassard, Høyer and Tapp suggested a quantum collision
finding algorithm (BHT) of O(N1/3) query complexity using quantum memory
amounting to O(N1/3) classical data. A multi-collision algorithm using BHT was
suggested in [30]. In this work however, we do not consider BHT as a candidate
algorithm for the following reasons. One is that the algorithm entails a need for
quantum memory where the realization and the usage cost are controversial [5],
and the other is that we are unable to come up with any implementation re-
stricted to use of elementary gates that do not exceed the total cost of O(N1/2).
Apart from quantum circuits, algorithms primarily designed for other type of
models such as measurement-based quantum computation also exist, for example
quantum walk search [48,19] or element distinctness [1], but we do not cover them
as state-of-the-art quantum architecture is targeting for circuit computation.
Interested readers may further refer to [30] and related references therein for
more information on quantum collision finding.
Bernstein analyzed quantum and classical collision finding algorithms in [10].
Quoting the work, no quantum algorithm with better time-space product com-
plexity than O(N1/2) which is achieved by the state-of-the-art classical algo-
rithm [42] had not been reported. If Grover’s algorithm is parallelized with the
distinguished point method, complexity of O(N1/2) can be achieved. This is one
of the examples of immediate ways to combine quantum search with the rho
method as mentioned in [10]. We denote it as Grover with distinguished point
(GwDP) algorithm in this paper.
In Asiacrypt 2017, Chailloux, Naya-Plasencia and Schrottenloher suggested
a new quantum collision finding algorithm, called CNS algorithm, of O(N2/5)
query complexity using O(N1/5) classical memory [18].
QAA algorithm. Basic structure of QAA is the same as Grover’s original
algorithm. Initial state |Ψ〉 = A|0〉 is prepared, and then Grover iteration Q is
repeatedly applied i times to get success probability (2). The only difference is
that in QAA, the preparation operator A is not restricted to H⊗n where N = 2n,
and so thus the search space can be arbitrarily defined. Detailed derivation is
not covered here, but instead we describe the key feature in an example.
As a trivial example, let us assume we are given a quantum computer, and try
to find a target bit-string 110011 in a set N = {x | x ∈ {0, 1}6 and two middle
bits are 0}. Domain size is not equal to 26, and the initial state can be prepared
by A = H1H2H5H6 whereHr is Hadamard gate acting on r-th qubit. Remaining
processes are to apply Grover iterations Q = −AS0A−1Sf with A given by the
2 There are two reasons. One is that Fixed-point search requires two oracle queries
per iteration, and the other is log(2/δ) factor in (3) in [52] which also increases the
required number of iterations depending on the bounding parameter δ. Comparing
these factors with the overhead in our method introduced by random statistics, we
concluded that the fixed-point algorithm is not favored.
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state preparation operator just mentioned. The search space examined is rather
trivial, but QAA also works on arbitrary domain. Non-trivial domain can be
given as something like N = {x | x ∈ {0, 1}6, f(x) 6= 0} for some given function
f . It is a matter of preparing a state encoding appropriate search space, or in
other words, that is to find an operator A. Once A is constructed, QAA works
in the same way as in Grover’s algorithm.
GwDP algorithm. GwDP algorithm is a parallelization of Grover’s algorithm.
Distinguished point (DP) can be defined by a function output whose d most
significant bits are zeros, denoted by d-bit DP. We allow the notation DP to
indicate a pair of DP and corresponding input or an input by itself.
For Sq = Sc = 2
s, use (n− 2s)-bit DP. By running Tq = O
(
2n/2−s
)
times of
Grover iterations, DP is expected to be found on each machine. Storing O(2s)
DPs sorted according to the output, a collision is found with high probability.
The time-space product is always TqSq = O
(
N1/2
)
.
CNS algorithm. CNS algorithm consists of two phases, the list preparation
and the collision finding. In the list preparation phase, a list of size 2l of d-bit
DPs is drawn up with the time complexity of O(2l+d/2) and the classical storage
of size O(2l). In the collision finding phase QAA algorithm is used. Each iteration
of QAA algorithm consists of O(2d/2) Grover iterations and O(2l) operations for
the list comparison. After O
(
2(n−d−l)/2
)
QAA iterations, a collision is expected
to be found. In total, CNS algorithm has O
(
2l+d/2 + 2(n−d−l)/2(2d/2 + 2l)
)
time
complexity and uses O(2l) classical memory. With the optimal parameters l =
d/2 and d = 2n/5, a collision is found in Tq = O(N
2/5) with Sc = O(N
1/5).
If Sq = 2
s , time complexity becomes O(2(n−d−l−s)/2(2d/2 + 2l) + 2l+d/2−s)
for s ≤ min(l, n − d − l). When l = d/2 and d = 2/5{n+ s}, the complexities
satisfy (Tq)
5(Sq)
3 = O(N2) and Tq(Sc)
3 = O(N).
2.3 AES and SHA-2 algorithms
A brief review of AES and SHA-2 are given in this subsection. Specifically, AES-
128 and SHA-256 algorithms are described which will form the main body of
later sections.
AES-128. Only the encryption procedure of AES-128 which is relevant to this
work will be shortly reviewed. See [39] for details.
Round. AES round consists of four elementary operations; SubBytes, ShiftRows,
MixColumns, and AddRoundKey3. Each operation applies to internal state,
which is represented by 4× 4 array of bytes Si,j , as shown in Fig. 2(a).
3 The first and the last rounds are different, but will not be covered in detail here.
7
– ShiftRows does cyclic shifts of the last three rows of the internal state by
different offsets.
– MixColumns does a linear transformation on each column of the internal
state that mixes the data.
– AddRoundKey does an addition of the internal state and the round key by
an XOR operation.
– SubBytes does a non-linear transformation on each byte. SubBytes works as
substitution-boxes (S-box) generated by computing a multiplicative inverse,
followed by a linear transformation and an addition of S-box constant.
Key Schedule. AES key schedule consists of four operations; RotWord, Sub-
Word, Rcon, and addition by XOR operation. The sequence of key scheduling
is described in Fig. 2(b). Each operation applies to 32-bit word wi, which is
represented by 4 × 1 array of bytes kdi,j . First four words are given by origi-
nal key which become the zeroth round key. More words− 40 in AES-128− are
then generated by recursively processing previous words. Every Sixteen byte kdi,j
constitutes d-th round key. RotWord, SubWord, and Rcon only apply to every
fourth word wi, i ∈ {3, 7, 11, ...39}.
– RotWord does a cyclic shift on four bytes.
– Rcon does an addition of the constant and the word by XOR operation.
– SubWord does an S-box operation on each byte in word.
SHA-256. For brevity, only SHA-256 hashing algorithm for one message block
which is relevant to this work will be reviewed. Description of preprocessing
including message padding, parsing, and setting initial hash value is also omitted
here. See [40] for details.
Round. SHA-2 round consists of five operations; Ch, Maj, Σ0, Σ1, and addition
modulo 232. Round operations apply on eight 32-bit working variables denoted
by a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h. See Fig. 3(a) for procedures.
– Ch(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (¬x ∧ z),
– Maj(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (x ∧ z)⊕ (y ∧ z),
– Σ0(x) = ROTR
2(x) ⊕ROTR13(x) ⊕ROTR22(x),
– Σ1(x) = ROTR
6(x) ⊕ROTR11(x) ⊕ROTR25(x),
where ROTRn(x) is circular right shift of x by n positions.
Message Schedule. SHA-2 message schedule consists of three operations; σ0, σ1,
and addition modulo 232. The sequence of message scheduling is described in
Fig. 3(b). Each operation applies to 32-bit word Wi. First 16 words are given by
original message block which become the first 16 words fed to SHA-256 rounds.
More words− 48 in SHA-256− are then generated by recursively processing
previous words.
– σ0(x) = ROTR
7(x)⊕ ROTR18(x) ⊕ SHR3(x),
– σ1(x) = ROTR
17(x) ⊕ROTR19(x) ⊕ SHR10(x),
where SHRn(x) is right shift of x by n positions.
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Fig. 2. (a) Round operations and (b) key schedule of AES-128 algorithm. Each square
box accommodates one byte. In key schedule, 128-bit key is divided into four 32-bit
words.
(a) (b)
a b c d e f g h
a b c d e f g h
Ch
wi
K i
∑
1
Maj
∑
0
… … …wi-16wi-15wi-14 wi-7 wi-6 wi-2 wi-1 0 0 …
σ0
σ1
… … …wi-16wi-15wi-14 wi-7 wi-6 wi-2 wi-1 0 …wi
σ0
σ1
… … …wi-16wi-15wi-14 wi-7 wi-6 wi-2 wi-1 …wi wi+1
Fig. 3. (a) Round operations and (b) message schedule of SHA-256 algorithm. Each
square box accommodates 32-bit word. The symbol ⊞ is addition modulo 232. Note
that new word can be overwritten on existing word if the word has already been fed
to round.
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2.4 Quantum Resource Estimates
Quantum resource estimates of Shor’s period finding algorithm have long been
studied in the various literature. See for example [45,46] and referenced materials
therein. On the other hand, quantitative quantum analysis on cryptographic
schemes other than period finding is still in its early stage. Partial list may
include attacks on multivariate-quadratic problems [47], hash functions [4,43],
and AES [27]. We introduce two of them which are the most relevant to our
work.
AES Key Search. Grassl et al. reported the quantum costs of AES-k key
search for k ∈ {128, 192, 256} in the units of logical qubit and gate [27]. In
estimating the time cost, the author’s focus was put on a specific gate called
‘T’ gate and its depth, although the overall gate count was also provided. Space
cost was simply estimated as the total number of qubits required to run Grover’s
algorithm.
There are two points we pay attention on. First is that the authors ensured
a single target key. Since AES algorithm works like a random function, there
is non-negligible probability that a plaintext end up with the same ciphertext
when encrypted by two different keys. To avoid the cases, the authors encrypt
r (∈ {3, 4, 5}) plaintext blocks simultaneously to obtain r ciphertexts so that only
the true key results in given ciphertexts. The procedure removes the ambiguity
in the number of iterations. Note, however, that the removal of the ambiguity
comes in exchange of at least tripling the space cost. The other point is that
reversible circuit implementation of internal functions of AES was always aimed
at reducing the number of qubits. One may see proposed circuit design as space-
optimized.
SHA-2 and SHA-3 Pre-Image Search. Amy et al. reported the quantum
costs of SHA-2 and SHA-3 pre-image search in the units of logical and physical
qubit and gate [4]. The method considers an error-correction scheme called sur-
face code. Time cost was set considering the scheme. Estimating the costs of T
gates in terms of physical resources was one of the main results. One point we
would like to address in the work is that random-like behavior of SHA function
was not considered. It is assumed in the paper that the unique pre-image of a
given hash exits.
3 Trade-offs in Query Complexity
The definitions of search problems involving random function are given. For each
problem, the expected iteration number of the corresponding quantum search
algorithm is calculated. Finally, the trade-offs equations between the number of
iterations and the number of quantum machines are given.
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3.1 Types of Search Problems
We assume that f : X → Y is random function which means f is selected from
the set of all functions from X to Y uniformly at random. Useful statistics of
random function can be found in [23]. The probabilities related to the number
of pre-images are quoted below. When an element x is selected from a set X
uniformly at random, it is denoted by x
$←X .
When |Y | = N and |X | = aN ∈ N for some a ∈ Q, an element y ∈ Y is
called a j-node if it has j pre-images, i.e., |{x ∈ X : f(x) = y}| = j. For y $←Y ,
the probability of y to be a j-node, denoted by q(aN)(j)(j ≥ 0), is approximately
q(aN)(j) =
1
ea
· a
j
j!
. (5)
For x
$←X , the probability of f(x) to be a j-node, denoted by r(aN)(j)(j ≥ 1),
is approximately
r(aN)(j) = j · q(aN)(j) . (6)
The target function in cryptanalytic search problems is usually modeled as
a pseudo-random function (PRF) or a cryptographic hash function (CHF). The
precise interpretation of this notions can be found in Sect. 3.5 and Sect. 5.5 of
[33]. It can be assumed that PRF and CHF have similar statistic behaviors to
random function.
The formal definitions of search problems relevant to symmetric cryptanal-
ysis can be described with random function. The way of generating the given
information in each problem is carefully distinguished. The first is key search
problem which comes from the secret key search problem using a pair of plain-
text and ciphertext of an encryption algorithm.
Definition 3 (Key Search (KS)). For a fixed f : X → Y , y = f(x0) generated
from an element x0
$←X is given. Key Search is to find the target x0.
The existence of the target x0 in X is always ensured. However pre-images of
y other than x0 can be found, which is called a false alarm. The false alarms have
to be resolved by additional information since no clue (that helps to recognize
the real target) is given within the problem. Handling of false alarms is assumed
not to consume quantum resources.
Definitions coming from the pre-image and the collision problems of CHF are
given as follows.
Definition 4 (Pre-image Search (PS)). For a fixed f : {0, 1}∗ → Y , y is
chosen at random, y
$←Y , or equivalently, y = f(x0) for x0 $←{0, 1}∗. Pre-image
Search is to find any x satisfying f(x) = y for given y.
There is no false alarm in pre-image search. However, the existence of a
pre-image in a fixed subset of {0, 1}∗ cannot be ensured.
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Definition 5 (Collision Finding (CF)). For a fixed f : {0, 1}∗ → Y , Colli-
sion Finding is to find any input pair (x1, x2) satisfying f(x1) = f(x2).
{0, 1}∗ is imported since a domain of reasonable size including the original
pre-image of a practically given hash value cannot be specified.
3.2 Trade-offs in Grover’s Algorithm for Key Search
In this subsection, the expected iteration number and the parallelization trade-
offs of Grover’s algorithm are given. We assume that |X | = |Y | = N .
In key search problem, y becomes t-node with probability r(t) of (6). The
probability that one of the pre-images of y is found by the measurement after
i-times Grover iterations becomes pt(i) of (2). Since only one target among t
pre-images is the true key, the probability that the answer is correct is 1/t.
PKSrand(i) denotes the success probability after i-times Grover iterations of key
search problem. To emphasize that f is assumed to be a random function, the
subscript ‘rand’ is specified. PKSrand(i) is the summation over possible t’s,
PKSrand(i) =
∑
t≥1
r(t) · pt(i) · 1
t
. (7)
Proposition about the optimal expected iterations follows.
Proposition 1. The optimal expected number, IKSrand of Grover iterations for key
search problem of random function becomes
IKSrand = 0.951 . . . ·
√
N .
Proof. This proof is similar to the one in Sect. 4 of [13].
If the measurement is made after i-times Grover iterations, the expected
number of iterations can be expressed as a function of i, denoted by IKSrand(i),
which reads
IKSrand(i) =
i
PKSrand(i)
.
The optimal value, IKSrand is the first positive local minimum value of I
KS
rand(i). The
first positive root of derivative of IKSrand(i), denoted by i
KS
rand, can be calculated by a
numerical analysis such as Newton’s method. The result is iKSrand = 0.434 . . . ·
√
N
and IKSrand = I
KS
rand(i
KS
rand). 
Comparing IKSrand with I1, the expected iteration increases by 37.8. . .%.
The parallel trade-offs curve of key search problem is calculated in the rest of
this subsection. If inner parallelization method is taken for Sq ≫ 1, the number
of pre-images of y in each divided space becomes only 0 or 1 for overwhelming
probability, even though f is random function. Therefore the success probability
after i-times iterations, denoted by PKS:IPrand (i), reads
PKS:IPrand (i) = P
KS:IP
rand,N(i) = p1,(N/Sq)(i) , (8)
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from (2). The optimal expected iteration number is similar to (4) as
IKS:IPrand = 0.690 . . . ·
√
(N/Sq) . (9)
In outer parallelization method, the success probability after i-times itera-
tions becomes
PKS:OPrand (i) = 1−
(
1− PKSrand(i)
)Sq
,
and then the optimal expected iteration number for Sq ≫ 1 is given by
IKS:OPrand = 0.784 . . . ·
√
(N/Sq) . (10)
As a result, inner parallelization is 11.9 . . .%more efficient than outer method
in key search problem. We denote the number of machines used in key search
problem SKSq . The optimal expected number of iterations in key search problem,
denoted by TKSq , can be considered as I
KS:IP
rand .
Proposition 2 (KS trade-offs curve). For SKSq ≫ 1, the parallelization
trade-offs of Grover’s algorithm for key search of random function is given by
(TKSq )
2SKSq = 0.476 . . . ·N .
In the followings, the optimal expected number of iterations and trade-offs
curves are defined and analyzed in the same way as in this subsection, but briefly.
3.3 Trade-offs in Grover’s Algorithm for Pre-image Search
Let X be the domain of the function f , and assume |X | = |Y | = N . In pre-
image search problem, there exit t pre-images of y with probability q(t) in (5).
The success probability of measuring one of the targets after i-times iterations
is a summation of q(t) · pt(i) over t as
PPSrand(i) =
∑
t≥0
q(t) · pt(i) .
Since p0(i) = 0 and q(t) = r(t)/t for t ≥ 1, it can be written as PPSrand(i) =
PKSrand(i). The important difference between the key search and the pre-image
search is the existence of failure probability. If the domain of size N is used, the
probability there is no pre-image of y in X is q(0) = 1/e ≈ 0.368 . . ..
Two resolutions can be sought for the failure. The first is to change the
domainX in every execution of Grover’s algorithm. In this case, the result on the
optimal iteration number of pre-image search becomes the same as Proposition 1.
The second is to expand the domain size, |X | = aN ∈ N for some a > 1. The
success probability then reads PPSrand,(aN)(i) =
∑
t≥1 q(aN)(t) · pt,(aN)(i).
13
Proposition 3. If |X | ≫ N , the optimal expected number of iterations, denoted
by IPSrand,(≫N), for pre-image search problem is written as
IPSrand,(≫N) = 0.690 . . . ·
√
N .
When N = 2256, the proposition can be assumed to hold for a ≥ 210. Subscript
‘≫ 1’ specifies the assumption. The fact that IPSrand,(≫N) ≈ I1,N , i.e., better
performance up to some converged value for larger domain size, is remarked.
If a grows to 8, the inversely proportional failure probability decreases below
0.0004 . . . ≈ 1/e8.
In the case of inner parallelization for |X | = |Y |, the pre-images of y are
distributed to different divided spaces with overwhelming probability when Sq ≫
1. The success probability reads
PPS:IPrand,N(i) =
∑
t≥1
q(t) ·
{
1− (1− p1,(N/Sq)(i))t
}
.
and the optimal expected iteration number is written as
IPS:IPrand,N = 0.981 . . . ·
√
(N/Sq) . (11)
Since PPSrand(i)=P
KS
rand(i), the behavior of outer parallelization of pre-image
search is the same as in key search. The optimal expected iteration number is
IPS:OPrand = 0.784 . . . ·
√
(N/Sq)
(
= IKS:OPrand
)
. (12)
When |X | = aN ∈ N for some a > 1, if Sq > a2, it can be assumed that
all pre-images of y are separately distributed to the divided space in inner par-
allelization. For both of inner and outer parallelization, the optimal expected
iteration converges to the value of (12) when a≫ 1 and Sq > a2.
There are subtleties in comparing inner and outer parallelization which are
inappropriate to be pointed out here. We conclude that it is always favored to
enlarge the domain size, and then for large Sq, two parallelization methods show
asymptotically the same performance. Denoting the optimal time and space
complexities for pre-image search problem by TPSq and S
PS
q , the trade-offs curve
is given as follows.
Proposition 4 (PS trade-offs curve). For SPSq ≫ 1, the parallelization trade-
offs of Grover’s algorithm for pre-image search of random function is given by
(TPSq )
2SPSq = 0.614 . . . ·N .
Note that while the inner parallelization is a better option in key search,
both methods have similar behaviors in pre-image search.
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3.4 Trade-offs in Quantum Collision Finding Algorithms
A collision could be found by using Grover’s algorithm in the way of second pre-
image search. This has the same result as Sect. 3.3 if the input of the given pair
of ‘first pre-image’ is not included in the domain. Apart from Grover’s algorithm,
the optimal expected iterations and trade-offs curves for parallelizations of two
collision finding algorithms, GwDP and CNS, are given in this subsection.
In collision finding algorithms, searching for a pre-image of large size set is
required. Let f : {0, 1}∗ → Y , X ⊂ {0, 1}∗ be a set of size aN ∈ N. For y $←Y , the
expected number of pre-images of y becomes a =
∑
j≥1 j · q(aN)(j). If the size of
a set A ⊂ Y is large enough, it can be assumed that the number of pre-images
of A, |{x ∈ X : f(x) ∈ A}| = a · |A|.
GwDP algorithm. Let Sq = 2
s and X ⊂ {0, 1}∗ be a set of size N . In each
quantum machine, a parameter (n − 2s + 2) is used for the number of bits to
be fixed in DPs. The parameter (n − 2s + 2) is chosen as an optimal one only
among integers in order to allow the easier implementation by quantum gates.
After i-times Grover iterations, the success probability of measuring a DP
becomes p(22s−2)(i) from (2). The expected number of DPs found is 2
s ·p(22s−2)(i)
by measurements after i-times iterations on each machine. As a result of birth-
day problem (BP), known to be proposed by R. Mises in 1939, if there are k
samples independently selected out of 22s−2 DPs, the probability of at least one
coincidence, denoted by pBP(22s−2)(k), is approximated as
pBP(22s−2)(k) = 1− exp
( −k2
2 · 22s−2
)
.
Details of approximation can be found in Sect. A.4 of [33]. The probability of
finding at least one collision, denoted by PGwDPrand (i), is then
PGwDPrand (i) = p
BP
(22s−2)
(
2s · p(22s−2)(i)
)
.
The optimal expected iteration reads
IGwDPrand = 1.532 . . . ·
√
N/2s . (13)
Denoting the optimal time and space complexities by TGwDPq and S
GwDP
q for
collision finding by GwDP algorithm, the trade-offs curve is given as follows.
Proposition 5 (GwDP trade-offs curve). For SGwDPq = 2
s ≫ 1, the trade-
offs curve of GwDP algorithm for random function is given by
TGwDPq S
GwDP
q = 1.532 . . . ·N
1
2 .
Note that the algorithm also requires SGwDPc = O(2
s) classical storage.
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CNS algorithm. In the list preparation phase, a list L of size 2l, a subset of
d-bit DPs, is to be made. Set X1 ⊂ {0, 1}∗ of size N = 2n and the function
fDP (x) =
{
1 , if f(x) is DP ,
0 , otherwise .
Let fDP |X1 be the restriction of fDP on X1. Grover iteration in this phase is
defined by QDP = −ADPS0A−1DPSfDP |X1 where the oracle operator SfDP |X1 is
a quantum implementation of the function fDP |X1 and ADP is a usual state
preparation operator H⊗n.
Since there are about 2n−d
(
= |X1|/2d
)
DPs in X1, the expected number of
Grover iterations to find a DP is the same as I2n−d = 0.690 . . . · 2d/2 of (4). The
expected number of Grover iterations to build L is 0.690 . . . · 2l+d/2. A classical
storage of size O(2l) is required in addition.
In the collision finding phase, let X2 ⊂ {0, 1}∗ be a set of size N such that
X1∩X2 = ∅. Let the state |ψ〉 be an equal-phase and equal-weight superposition
of states encoding all the DPs in X2. State preparation operator AL such that
|ψ〉 = AL|0〉 is explicitly
AL = (−ADPS0A−1DPSfDP |X2 )(pi/4)·2
d/2
ADP ,
which is essentially Grover iterations similar to QDP with repetition number
Imp
2n−d
of (3). The function fL : X2 → {0, 1} is defined as
fL(x) =
{
1 , if f(x) ∈ L ,
0 , otherwise .
To realize the oracle operator SfL− a quantum implementation of fL− without a
need for quantum memory, the authors have suggested a computational method
taking O(2l) elementary operations per quantum fL query.
QAA iteration QL of the collision finding phase consists of two steps. The
first is acting of the oracle operator SfL . Let tL be the ratio of the time cost of
SfL per list element of L to that of Grover iteration. The second step is acting
of the diffusion operator −ALS0A−1L .
The success probability of QAA algorithm is known to have the same behav-
iors of Grover’s algorithm [14]. Since there are about 2n−d
(
= 2n · (1/2d)) DPs
encoded in the state with equal probabilities and about 2l
(
= 2n−d · (2l/2n−d))
pre-images of L in |ψ〉, by applyingQL operator I(2l),(2n−d) = 0.690 . . .·2(n−d−l)/2
times on |ψ〉, the algorithm is expected to find a collision. The time cost of the
collision finding phase reads 0.690 . . .·2(n−d−l)/2 ·{2 · (pi/4) · 2d/2 + tL · 2l}. Note
that the time cost of S0 in collision finding phase and the initial AL are negli-
gible. The time cost of CNS algorithm in terms of Grover iterations denoted by
ICNSrand (d, l) reads
ICNSrand (d, l) = 0.690 . . . · 2l+
d
2 + 0.690 . . . · 2n−d−l2
(pi
2
· 2 d2 + tL · 2l
)
. (14)
The optimal value ICNSrand is given as follows.
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Proposition 6. The optimal expected number of Grover iterations in CNS al-
gorithm for collision finding of random function reads
ICNSrand = 3.150 . . . · t
1
5
L · 2
2
5
n ,
when l = d/2 + log2 (pi/(2tL)), and d = 2/5{n+ log2
(
(2tL)
3/pi
)}.
Using Sq = 2
s quantum machines, natural parallelization of the list prepa-
ration phase is finding 2l−s elements on each machine. Outer parallelization of
QAA algorithm in the collision finding phase has the same expected iterations
as (12). The expected number of Grover iterations, denoted by ICNS:OPrand (d, l),
where s < min(l, n− d− l), is written as
ICNS:OPrand (d, l) = 0.690 . . . · 2l+
d
2
−s + 0.784 . . . · 2n−d−l−s2
(pi
2
· 2 d2 + tL2l
)
.
When l = d/2+ log2 (pi/(2tL)), and d = 2/5{n+ s+ log2
(
1.291 . . . · (2tL)3/pi
)},
the optimal expected number of iterations reads
ICNS:OPrand = 3.488 . . . · t
1
5
L2
2
5
n2−
3
5
s . (15)
We denote the optimal time and space complexities by TCNSq and S
CNS
q for
collision finding by CNS algorithm. TCNSq can be considered as I
CNS:OP
rand . The
trade-offs curve of CNS algorithm is then given as follows.
Proposition 7 (CNS trade-offs curve). For SCNSq ≫ 1, the parallelization
trade-offs curve of CNS algorithm for random function is given by
(TCNSq )
5(SCNSq )
3 = (3.488 . . .)5 · tL ·N2 .
The algorithms also requires the classical resource SCNSc = O
(
N1/5(SCNSq )
1/5
)
.
If the constant tL is determined, the time-space complexity of CNS algorithm
could be derived from this trade-offs curve.
4 Depth-Qubit Cost Metric
Universal quantum computers are capable of carrying out elementary logic op-
erations such as Pauli X, Hadamard, CNOT, T, and so on. See [38] for details
on quantum gates. Implementation of any cryptographic operation in this pa-
per is restricted such that it can only be realized by using these gates. One
may think of the restriction as a quantum version of software implementation in
classical computing. Quantum security of symmetric cryptosystems can then be
estimated in units of elementary logic gates.
It is generally known that each elementary gate has different physical imple-
mentation time. Considering various aspects of quantum computing, we suggest
to simplify a measure of computation time and to ignore all the other factors or
gates that complicates the analysis of quantum algorithms.
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Two primary resources in quantum computing, circuit depth and qubit, can
be exchanged to meet a certain attack design criteria. Time-space complexity
investigated in the previous section can be used to give an attribute ‘efficiency’
to each and every design. To further quantify depth-qubit complexity and to be
able to rank the efficiency, we briefly cover the time-space trade-offs of quantum
resources in this section.
4.1 Cost Measure
Difficulties often arise when it comes to setting quantum complexity measures
that are physically interpretable. There exists a number of factors making it
complicate, for example totally different architecture each experimental group is
pursuing. A qubit or a certain gate may costs differently in each architecture. It
is therefore hardly possible to accurately assess operational time of each type of
gate in general, and to estimates overall run time. Despite the notable difficulty
in quantifying the basic unit cost of quantum computation, a number of groups
have attempted to estimate the algorithm costs in various applications [4,27,43].
The cost metric varies depending on author’s viewpoint. For example, one con-
sidering the fault-tolerant computation would estimate the cost involving specific
hardware implementations or error-correction schemes. On the other hand, one
that is not to impose constraints on hardware or error-correction scheme would
estimate the cost in logical qubits and gates. The latter approach is adopted in
this work. Readers should keep in mind that this approach ignores the overheads
introduced by fault-tolerance4.
High-level circuit description of Grover iteration involves not only elementary
gates but also larger gates such as CkNOT. It is very unlikely that such gates
can be directly operated in any realistic universal quantum computers. Decom-
position of those gates into smaller ones is thus required in practical estimates.
Determining the unit time cost is a subtle matter. We would like to address
that the simplest, yet justified time cost measure involves Toffoli gate.
Definition 6. A unit of quantum computational time cost is the time required
to operate a non-parallelizable Toffoli gate.
In other words, Toffoli-depth will be the time cost of the algorithm. Three
justifications can be given for the distinctness of Toffoli gates. First, Toffoli (and
single) gates are universal [21,49,50]. Second, circuits consisting only of Clifford
gates are not advantageous over classical computing, implying that the use of
non-Clifford gates such as Toffoli is essential for quantum benefit [26]. Third,
logical Toffoli gates are the main source of time bottleneck [4,24,32] due to
the magic state distillation process for T gates [17] which comes only from a
decomposition of Toffoli gates in this work. See for example in [4], the ratio of
execution time in all Clifford gates to all T gates is about 0.0001 . . . in SHA-256
when fault-tolerance is considered. To sum up we adopt universal Toffoli gate as
4 Fault-tolerant cost could be in general huge, but we expect that logical cost to fault-
tolerant cost conversion would be more or less uniform.
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the only non-Clifford gate, which is responsible for quantum speedup as well as
main time bottleneck of circuits presented in this paper. Moreover it is plausible
to assume that multiple Toffoli gates can be applied to qubits simultaneously as
long as their input/output qubits are independent, justifying Definition 6.
Space cost is estimated as a total number of logical qubits required to perform
the quantum search algorithm.
Definition 7. Quantum computational space cost is the number of logical qubits
required to run the entire circuit.
Decomposition of a high-level circuit component into smaller ones often en-
tails a need for additional qubits, which sometimes turn into garbage bits or
get cleaned after certain operations. Overall space cost mainly comes from these
qubits. To avoid confusion caused by terminology, we clarify five kinds of qubits.
1. Data qubits are qubits of which the space is searched by the quantum
search algorithm. For example in AES-128, the size of the key space is 2128
which requires 128 data qubits.
2. Work qubits are initialized qubits those assist certain operation. Whether
it stays in an initialized value or gets written depends on the operation.
3. Garbage qubits are previously initialized work qubits, which then get writ-
ten unwanted information after a certain operation.
4. Output qubits are previously initialized work qubits, which then get writ-
ten the output information of a certain operation.
5. Oracle qubit is a single qubit used for phase kick-back (sign change) in
oracle and diffusion operators.
There is one more type of qubit not falling into above categories; a borrowed
qubit [29]. The concept of the borrowed qubit is not considered in this work.
Garbage and output qubits must be re-initialized before the diffusion of Grover
iteration to be disentangled from data qubits.
4.2 Toffoli and T Gates
Commonly acknowledged universal quantum gate set consists of Clifford gates
and T gate. As stated in the previous subsection, operational time costs of
different gates may vary depending on architecture. However, it is less disputable
that physical implementation of T gate (or preparation of the magic state) is
important, difficult, and generally more expensive than Clifford gates. There are
communities dedicated to better implementation of T [16,17,31,36] and reducing
the number of the gates applied [2,3,12,25,46], as it is time bottleneck in fault-
tolerant quantum computing.
Toffoli gate is a non-Clifford gate that is composed of a few T and Clifford
gates. Taking Toffoli gate over T gate as a basic unit of time resource has its
merits and demerits. We cautiously compare the relation between Toffoli and T
to the one between high- and low-level languages. Example of implementation
of a two-bit addition in terms of Toffoli and T gates are given in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Addition of two bits a and b in terms of (a) Toffoli and (b) T gates (Fig. 7(d)
in [3]). The third qubit (output qubit) is written a carry. The third and the second
qubits save the binary representation of a+ b as ab · 21 + (a⊕ b) · 20.
Being reminded that Toffoli and CNOT operate as
TOF|a〉|b〉|0〉 = |a〉|b〉|0⊕ ab〉 , CNOT|a〉|b〉 = |a〉|a⊕ b〉 ,
respectively, it is immediately noticeable from Fig. 4(a) that the circuit works
as a two-bit addition operator. The same operation realized by depth-optimized
Clifford+T set [3] is described in Fig. 4(b). Assuming that a given quantum
computer can only perform gates in Clifford+T set, this circuit enables more
transparent expectation of runtime.
Typically in previous studies a quantum algorithm is first implemented in
Toffoli-level, and then the circuit undergoes a kind of ‘compilation’ process that
looks for an elementary-level circuit [4,46]. Finding an optimal compiling method
is very complicated and worth researching [43]. At this stage however, it is hardly
possible to find true optimal elementary-level circuit from compiling huge high-
level circuit. In this work therefore, we stay in Toffoli-level implementation con-
forming the purpose of providing a general framework.
4.3 Time-Space Trade-offs
Readers those are familiar with quantum circuit model can safely skip over
this subsection as it covers some general facts about depth-qubit trade-offs. In
quantum circuit model, it is often possible to sacrifice efficiency in qubits for
better performance in time and vice versa. Quantum version of such time-space
trade-offs forms a main body of Sect(s). 5 and 6. As preliminary we give an
example to introduce the general concept of trade-offs in quantum circuits.
Consider a function f that carries out binary multiplications of k single bit
values. At the end of this subsection we will deal with general k, but for now,
let us explicitly write down the description with k = 2, the multiplication of
two bits a and b as f(a, b) = ab. It is noticeable that the function f can be
implemented by AND gate in a classical circuit. However in a quantum circuit
where only unitary operations are allowed, similar implementation is prohibited
since AND operation is not unitary as the input information a, b cannot be
retrieved by knowing ab only. Simple resolution can be found by keeping the
input information all the way such that
Uf |a〉|b〉|0〉 = |a〉|b〉|0 ⊕ ab〉 , (16)
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where |a〉 and |b〉 are quantum states encoding a and b, and Uf is the quantum
implementation of the function f . Previously zeroed qubit represented by the
state |0〉 on the left-hand side holds the result after the operation. There ex-
ists a quantum gate that exactly performs the operation by Uf called a k-fold
controlled-NOT (CkNOT) with k = 2, or better known as Toffoli gate. Fig-
ure 5(a) illustrates the graphical representation of C2NOT gate achieving (16).
General CkNOT gates read k input bits carried by wires intersecting with black
dots and change a target bit carried by a wire intersecting with exclusive-or
symbol. In this case, the gate works as NOT on target bit if a = b = 1 and
identity otherwise.
(a) (b)
c
d
0   ab0
b
a
b
a
0
b
a
0   abcd
d
c
b
a
Fig. 5. (a) C2NOT (Toffoli) gate and (b) C4NOT gate
Similarly, multiplications of four bits can be implemented by using C4NOT
gate as shown in Fig. 5(b). C4NOT gate carries out NOT operation on target
bit if a = b = c = d = 1 and nothing otherwise.
Now assume we are to split up a C4NOT gate into multiple Toffoli gates with
the help of a few extra qubits. Decomposing a large gate into smaller gates is
a typical task one confront in compilation [43]. There can be various ways to
achieve the goal, and one of the immediate designs is the one in Fig. 6(a).
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Fig. 6. Decomposition of C4NOT gate into (a) five Toffoli gates and (b) ten Toffoli
gates. In (a), the third and the fifth zeroed qubits from the top are work qubits whereas
in (b), only the fifth arbitrary-valued qubit is a work qubit.
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Let us examine the action of each Toffoli gate on the register one-by-one,
|a〉|b〉|0〉|c〉|0〉|d〉|0〉 17→ |a〉|b〉|ab〉|c〉|0〉|d〉|0〉
27→ |a〉|b〉|ab〉|c〉|abc〉|d〉|0〉 37→ |a〉|b〉|ab〉|c〉|abc〉|d〉|abcd〉
47→ |a〉|b〉|ab〉|c〉|0〉|d〉|abcd〉 57→ |a〉|b〉|0〉|c〉|0〉|d〉|abcd〉 ,
(17)
where the circled number above the mapping arrow indicates the corresponding
Toffoli gate in Fig. 6(a). The result actually comes out after 3 , but we further
perform a kind of un-computation with two extra Toffoli gates to re-initialize
the work qubits. It is up to users to decide whether the procedure should stop
just after 3 at the cost of two garbage qubits being generated, or go all the way
to the end of the circuit. As one can notice, it is already the trade-offs.
A less straightforward decomposition can be found in Fig. 6(b). It makes use
of twice as many Toffoli gates as Fig. 6(a) but requires only a single arbitrary
qubit5. Each Toffoli gate transforms the state as follows.
|a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w〉|0〉 1 , 27→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w〉|ab〉
37→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w ⊕ abc〉|ab〉 47→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w ⊕ abc〉|0〉
57→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w ⊕ abc〉|abcd⊕ dw〉
67→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w ⊕ abc⊕ abcd⊕ cdw〉|abcd ⊕ dw〉
77→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w ⊕ abc⊕ abcd⊕ cdw〉|abcd ⊕ dw ⊕ ab〉
87→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w〉|abcd ⊕ dw ⊕ ab〉
97→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w〉|abcd ⊕ dw〉 107→ |a〉|b〉|c〉|d〉|w〉|abcd〉 .
(18)
Both designs work as desired. In fact for general k, time-efficient design as
in Fig. 6(a) requires k − 2 zeroed work qubits within depth 2k − 3, whereas
space-efficient design as in Fig. 6(b) uses only one arbitrary qubit within depth
8k − 24 (for k ≥ 5) [6]. We denote time- and space-efficient designs lower-depth
and less-qubit CkNOT, respectively.
Bit multiplication is one of examples qubit and depth are mutually exchange-
able. In Sect(s). 5 and 6 we will compare multiple circuits that do the same job
with a different number of qubits, and examine the consequence of each design
when parallelized.
5 Complexity of AES-128 Key Search
This section presumes that readers are familiar with standard AES-128 encryp-
tion algorithm [39]. We assume that a quantum adversary is given a plaintext-
ciphertext pair and asked to find the key used for the encryption. Since AES-128
works as a PRF, it is possible that multiple keys lead to the same ciphertext,
AES(k0, p) = AES(k1, p) = · · · ,
5 The first Toffoli gate in Fig. 6(b) is redundant in this case, but needed if one wants
to carry out z ⊕ abcd, where z is the initial value of the last qubit.
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where ki ∈ {0, 1}128 are different keys and p is a given plaintext. The term pre-
image will be used to denote each key ki that generates given ciphertext upon
the encryption of given plaintext.
oracle
data
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COMP.
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AES-128
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0
AES-128
Reverse{
output
0
0
Fig. 7. Oracle circuit for key search attack on AES-128
The idea of applying Grover’s algorithm to exhaustive attack on AES-128 is
as follows. Linearly superposed 2128 input keys encoded in 128 data qubits are
fed as an input to an AES box shown in Fig. 7. AES box contains a reversible
circuit implementation of AES-128 encryption algorithm. The AES box encrypts
the given plaintext, outputting superposed ciphertexts encoded in output qubits.
Superposed ciphertexts are then compared with given ciphertext via C128NOT
gate to mark the target. After marking is done, every qubit except the oracle
qubit is passed on to a reverse AES box to disentangle the data qubits from
other qubits.
5.1 Circuit Implementation Cost
AES-128 encryption internally performs SubBytes, MixColumns, ShiftRows, Ad-
dRoundKey, SubWord, RotWord and Rcon. Quantum circuits for these opera-
tions are mostly adopted from [27] with improvements and fixes.
MixColumns, ShiftRows and RotWord are linear operations acting on 32 bits
that do not require any work qubit nor Toffoli gate. Among them, last two are
simple bit permutations which require no quantum gates (by re-wiring) or at
most SWAP gates. MixColumns needs to be treated more carefully as it is not
a bit permutation. Treating each four-byte column of the internal state as a
length-four vector, MixColumns is expressed as a matrix multiplication,


s′0,j
s′1,j
s′2,j
s′3,j

 =


02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02




s0,j
s1,j
s2,j
s3,j

 , for 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 , (19)
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where 01, 02, 03 are sub-matrices when each byte si,j is treated as a length-eight
vector, written as
01 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


, 02 =


0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


, 03 =


1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


.
Since an explicit form of transformation matrix is given in (19), the quantum
circuit implementation of the matrix can be found by methods given in [11,44].
AddRoundKey and Rcon are XOR-ings of fixed-size strings which can also
be efficiently realized by CNOT or X gates only.
(a) (b)
round key{
round register{
X
Rcon[9]=0x1b
X
X
X
x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
Fig. 8. Quantum circuit implementation of (a) AddRoundKey and (b) Rcon. In (b),
Rcon[9] circuit is given as an example.
SubBytes and SubWord are the only operations which require quantum re-
sources. Since SubBytes and SubWord consist of 16 and 4 S-boxes, the S-box is
the only operation to be carefully discussed.
Classically, S-box can be implemented as a look-up table. However, a quan-
tum counterpart of such table should involve the notion of the quantum memory
aforementioned in Sect. 2.2. Therefore in this work, S-box is realized by explicitly
calculating multiplicative inverse followed by GF-linear mapping and addition
of the S-box constant as described in Sect. 3.2.1 of [27].
S-box is realized by calculating multiplicative inverse followed by GF-linear
mapping and addition of S-box constant. By treating a byte as an element in
GF(28) = GF(2)[x]/(x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1), GF-linear mapping and addition of
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S-box constant are summarized as the equation


x′0
x′1
x′2
x′3
x′4
x′5
x′6
x′7


=


1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1




x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7


+


1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0


, (20)
where addition is XOR operation and xi are coefficients of polynomial of order
x7. No work qubit nor Toffoli gate is required in this step. While XOR operation
is simply done by applying X gates to relevant qubits, implementing a transfor-
mation matrix in (20) is not trivial. See [11,44] for general methods of realizing
linear transformations.
Resource estimate of quantum AES-128 encryption has been narrowed down
to estimate the cost of finding multiplicative inverse of the element α in GF(28).
In [27], multiplicative inverse of α is calculated by using two arithmetic circuits;
Maslov et al.’s modular multiplier [35] and in-place squaring [27]. Slight mod-
ification of previous method is found in this work with seven multipliers being
used, verified by the quantum circuit simulation by matrix product state [51],
with the seven multipliers being used as following sequences,
|α〉 |α〉 |α〉 |α〉 |α〉 |α〉
|0〉
CNOTs7−→
|0〉
Sq7−→
|0〉
Mul7−→
|0〉 Sq−1
CNOTs7−→
|0〉
Sq×27−→
|0〉
|0〉 |α〉 |α2〉 |α2〉 |0〉 |0〉
|0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |α3〉 |α3〉 |α12〉
|0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉
|α〉 |α〉 |α〉 |α64〉 |α64〉 |α〉
CNOTs
Sq×27−→
|0〉 Mul
Sq−1×27−→
|0〉 CNOTs
Sq−1×27−→
|0〉 Sq×6
Mul7−→
|0〉 Mul
Sq7−→
|α254〉 Sq−1×6
Mul−17−→
|α254〉
|0〉 |α60〉 |α60〉 |α60〉 |α60〉 |α60〉
|α12〉 |α12〉 |α3〉 |α3〉 |α3〉 |α3〉
|α48〉 |α12〉 |0〉 |α63〉 |α63〉 |0〉
|α〉 |α〉 |α〉 |α〉 |α〉 |α〉
Sq×2
CNOTs7−→
|α254〉 Sq×2
Mul−17−→
|α254〉 Sq−1×2
CNOTs7−→
|α254〉 CNOTs
Sq−1×27−→
|α254〉 Sq
Mul−17−→
|α254〉 Sq−1
CNOTs7−→
|α254〉
|α60〉 |0〉 |0〉 |α〉 |α2〉 |0〉
|α12〉 |α12〉 |α12〉 |α3〉 |0〉 |0〉
|α12〉 |α48〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 ,
(21)
where each state ket represents eight-bit register, Sq and Mul denote modular
squaring and multiplication operations, and CNOTs implies eight CNOT gates
copying the string. Seven multipliers including reverse operations have been used
as can be seen from (21).
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As squaring in GF(28) is linear, it does not involve the use of Toffoli nor
work qubits. Therefore it is only required to estimate the cost of multipliers.
Table 1 summarizes the elementary operation costs in AES-128. Two distinct
multipliers are considered in this work; Maslov et al.’s design [35] and Kepley
and Steinwandt’s design [34].
Table 1. Costs of elementary operations in AES-128. A quarter of work qubits needed
in S-box turn into garbage qubits.
Less-qubit Lower-depth
Multiplier S-box Multiplier S-box
Toffoli-depth 18 126 8 56
Work qubits 8 32 27 108
First four multiplications in S-box are aimed at computing the multiplicative
inverse. Remaining three (reverse) multiplications are then used to clean garbage
qubits produced by previous multiplications. At the end of S-box, a quarter of
total work qubits needed in S-box turn into garbage qubits.
5.2 Design Candidates
Four main trade-offs points are considered.
First point, that has an impact on the overall design, is to determine whether
key schedule and AES rounds are carried out in parallel. As S-box is used both
in key schedule and AES round, schedule-round parallel implementation would
require more work qubits. This option is denoted by serial/parallel schedule-
round.
Second, AES round functions can be reversed in the middle of encryption
process to save work qubits. The idea of reverse AES round was suggested in Sect.
3.2.3 in [27]. Since each run of round function produces garbage qubits, forward
running of 10 rounds accumulates ≥ 1280 garbage qubits. Putting reverse rounds
in between forward rounds reduce a large amount of work qubits at the cost of
longer Toffoli-depth. This option is denoted by reverse round when applied.
Thirdly, a choice of multiplier could make an important trade-offs point.
Less-qubit and lower-depth multipliers are two options. For simplicity, we do
not consider adaptive use of both multipliers although it is possible to improve
the efficiency by using appropriate multiplier in different part of circuit. This
option is denoted by less-qubit/lower-depth multiplier.
Fourth, to present the extremely depth-optimized circuit design, the clean-
ing process in S-box could be skipped leaving every work qubit used in S-box
garbage. This option is denoted by S-box un-cleaning when applied.
In total, there exist 16 (=24) different circuit designs. We only take six of
them into account as others seem to be flawed compared with the six. Six designs
are denoted as follows.
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– AES-C1: Serial schedule-round, reverse-round, less-qubit multiplier
– AES-C2: Serial schedule-round, reverse-round, lower-depth multiplier
– AES-C3: Parallel schedule-round, less-qubit multiplier
– AES-C4: Parallel schedule-round, lower-depth multiplier
– AES-C5: Parallel schedule-round, less-qubit multiplier, S-box un-cleaning
– AES-C6: Parallel schedule-round, lower-depth multiplier, S-box un-cleaning
5.3 Comparison
Toffoli-depth and total number of qubits are carefully estimated for each design.
Costs of quantum AES-128 encryption circuit and entire Grover’s algorithm on a
single quantum processor is summarized in Table 2. Estimates for single Grover
iteration is omitted from the table as it can easily be calculated from costs of
AES-128 encryption circuit;
cost(Grover iteration) = 2 · cost(AES-128) + 2 · cost(C128NOT) ,
where cost(C) is Toffoli-depth of a circuit C. Note that full Toffoli-depth of the
entire Grover’s algorithm is estimated considering IKSrand in Proposition 1.
Table 2. Costs of AES-128 encryption circuit and entire attack circuit on a single
quantum processor. MAXDEPTH is not considered.
AES-128 Grover
Toffoli-depth Qubits Toffoli-depth Qubits
AES-C1 11088 984 1.360 . . .× 278 985
AES-C2 4928 3017 1.290 . . .× 277 3018
AES-C3 1260 2208 1.405 . . .× 275 2209
AES-C4 560 7148 1.510 . . .× 274 7149
AES-C5 720 6654 1.808 . . .× 274 6655
AES-C6 320 21854 1.064 . . .× 274 21855
Table 3. Comparison of time-space complexity of different AES-128 circuit designs
without the oracle assumption. The smallest cKS# is found by AES-C4 with c
KS
4 =
1.048 . . .× 233. Other values are divided by cKS4 for easier comparison.
AES-C1 AES-C2 AES-C6 AES-C5 AES-C3 AES-C4
cKS# /c
KS
4 28.606 . . . 19.705 . . . 1.519 . . . 1.333 . . . 1.070 . . . 1
Proposition 2 basically sets up the criterion for a comparison of circuit de-
signs. Here we replace TKSq and S
KS
q by T KSq and SKSq , respectively, denoting
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Toffoli-depth and total number of qubits in key search problem, i.e.,
(T KSq )2 SKSq = cKS# N , (22)
where cKS# varies depending on circuit designs. Now a parameter c
KS
# is the
only ‘yardstick’ that tells us which design is better. When parallelized for large
Sq, the expected iteration number converges to the one given in (9). Taking
the converged value, the cKS# for each circuit design is summarized in Table 3.
Assuming the MAXDEPTH is capped at some fixed value smaller than
√
N , the
table indicates that for example AES-C1 requires about 28.6. . . times as many
qubits as AES-C4.
5.4 Comparison to Ensured Single Target
It is possible to guarantee an existence of a single target by using multiple
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. To ensure a single target, the oracle now performs
r AES encryptions simultaneously. In [27], r = 3 is chosen for AES-128. Each
AES box encrypts different plaintext with the same superposed input keys. As
a result, for example for r = 3 in AES-128, the probability that two pre-images
exist is the same as for k1 to exist such that
AES(k0, p1)‖AES(k0, p2)‖AES(k0, p3)=AES(k1, p1)‖AES(k1, p2)‖AES(k1, p3) ,
where ‖ is concatenation, k0 is the true key and pi are distinct plaintexts. The
cost of guaranteeing a single target is more or less multiplying the total number
of qubits by r.
Table 4. Comparison of attack design with and without a single target. Toffoli-depth
of encryption circuit is the same in both, because the same AES design is implemented.
It is noticeable that the full Toffoli-depth of Unique Key is not far different from that
of AES-C4, although the number of qubits is nearly doubled.
AES-128 Grover
Toffoli-depth Qubits Toffoli-depth Qubits
Unique Key 560 14296 1.269 . . .× 274 14297
AES-C4 560 7148 1.510 . . .× 274 7149
It is now natural to ask if the oracle operator with a single target is more
cost-efficient than the random function oracle with less qubits. Assuming r = 2
guarantees a single target, we compare a design dubbed Unique Key with AES-
C4. Unique Key’s encryption circuit design is chosen to be the same as AES-C4,
meaning that the difference in efficiency solely comes from ensuring a single
target. Results are summarized in Table 4. Full Toffoli-depth of Unique Key is
estimated considering I1 in (4). With a guaranteed single target, Toffoli-depth is
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expected to be shortened compared with AES-C4 at the cost of doubling qubits.
Although ensuring single target can be regarded as the optimization point when
using single processor, it strictly cannot be an option in parallel attack since the
inner parallelization removes a penalty of random characteristics as in (8).
6 Complexity of SHA-256 Pre-image Search
This section presumes that readers are familiar with standard SHA-256 [40].
The idea of applying Grover’s algorithm to pre-image attack on SHA-256 is as
follows.
oracle
data
work
α
512 – α
256
COMP.
hash
SHA-256
in}
o
u
t
SHA-256
Reverse
{
(padding)
work
output 0
0
0
Fig. 9. Oracle circuit for pre-image attack on SHA-256
A message block consisting of α bits of message and 512− α bits of padding
are input to the hash box as shown in Fig. 9. Hash box contains a reversible
circuit implementation of SHA-256 to permit superposed input. The input of
linearly superposed 2α messages are then passed on to the hash box resulting
in superposed corresponding hashes. Processed hashes are then compared with
the given hash via C256NOT gate. After the target is marked, the entire qubits
except the oracle qubit are further processed through the reverse hash box as
in Fig. 9. The quantum state of the data qubits at the end of Fig. 9 reads
|ψ〉 = 1√
2α
(|00 · · · 0〉+|00 · · ·1〉+· · ·−|ti〉+ · · ·+|11 · · ·1〉)⊗ |padding〉 ,
where each ket state encodes a message and ti’s are pre-images of the given hash
value. The number of targets probabilistically varies depending on α which is
capped at 447(= 512− 64− 1).
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6.1 Circuit Implementation Cost
SHA-256 internally performs five elementary operations, σ0(1), Σ0(1), Ch, Maj,
and ADDER (modular addition) [40].
Among internal operations carried out in SHA-256, Σ0(1) consists only of
XOR-ings of bit permutations. Results of three ROTR operations are written
on 32-bit output register, with being successively XOR-ed. Only CNOT gates
are involved in implementation with 32 work qubits.
Similarly, σ0(1) is implemented with one difference from Σ0(1), that is SHR.
SHR itself is not linear, but writing a result of SHR on 32-bit output register
is possible. Therefore, σ0(1) is also efficiently realized by CNOT gates with 32
work qubits.
Ch and Maj are bit-wise operations that do require Toffoli gates. We adopt
Amy et al.’s design where Ch and Maj require one and two Toffoli gates, respec-
tively. See Figs. 4 and 5 in [4].
Serial schedule-round implementation of SHA-256 is illustrated in Fig. 10.
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Fig. 10. Reversible circuit for serial implementation of SHA-256 message schedule and
round function. The message block consisting of 16 words are recursively updated in-
place. Note that it is straightforward to make message schedule and round functions
work in parallel by expanding the work space. Seven two-qubit gates at the end of
round are SWAP gates. The symbol ⊞ is addition modulo 232.
Low-level circuit design for each function in this work is mostly adopted
from [4] except ADDER choice and totally re-designed message schedule. A few
options are available for ADDER circuits one can adopt (see for example, [45]).
For our purpose of comparing various circuit designs, we choose two versions
of adders; a poly-depth ADDER [20] and a log-depth ADDER [22]. Table 5
summarizes resource costs of elementary operations in SHA-256.
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Table 5. Costs of elementary operations in SHA-256. Work qubits in ADDER columns
get cleaned within the respective Toffoli-depth. Outputs of σ0(1), Σ0(1), Ch, and Maj
are written on work qubits.
ADDER (poly) ADDER (log) σ0(1), Σ0(1) Ch Maj
Toffoli-depth 61 22 0 1 2
Work qubits 1 53 32 32 32
6.2 Design Candidates
Three optimization points are considered.
First point, that has an impact on the overall design, is to determine whether
message schedule and round functions are carried out in parallel. Figure 10 shows
a serial circuit implementation of SHA-256. In the algorithm description, i-th
round function is fed by i-th word from the schedule meaning that parallel im-
plementation is possible if enough work qubits are given. This option is denoted
by serial/parallel schedule-round.
Second point is to determine which ADDER is to be used. Use of the poly-
depth ADDER is better in saving work space whereas the log-depth ADDER
could shorten the execution time. For simplicity, we do not consider adaptive
use of both ADDERs although it is possible to improve the efficiency by using
appropriate ADDER in different part of circuit. This option is denoted by poly-
depth/log-depth ADDER.
Lastly, it is now optional to decide how many work qubits are to be used to
implement C256NOT gate for marking the targets (hash comparison). As dis-
cussed in Sect. 4.3, CkNOT gate can be one of the trade-offs points. However in
AES-128, we do not need to consider C128NOT as an optimization point seri-
ously since the encryption process accompanies enough number of work qubits
that can be reused in lower-depth C128NOT gate. Situation is different in SHA-
256. It is noticeable that hashing process of SHA-256 does not involve as many
work qubits as AES-128, meaning that the lower-depth C256NOT gate cannot
be implemented unless more qubits are introduced solely for hash comparison.
Toffoli-depth and work qubits required for lower-depth (less-qubit) C256NOT
gate are 509 (2024) and 254 (1), respectively. Note that lower-depth and less-
qubit CkNOT gates present here are only two extreme exemplary designs. This
option is denoted by less-qubit/lower-depth C256NOT.
In total, there exist 8 (=23) distinct circuit designs. We only analyze six of
them since others do not seem to have merits. Six designs are denoted as follows.
– SHA-C1: Serial schedule-round, poly-depth ADDER, less-qubit C256NOT
– SHA-C2: Serial schedule-round, log-depth ADDER, less-qubit C256NOT
– SHA-C3: Serial schedule-round, log-depth ADDER, lower-depth C256NOT
– SHA-C4: Parallel schedule-round, poly-depth ADDER, less-qubit C256NOT
– SHA-C5: Parallel schedule-round, log-depth ADDER, less-qubit C256NOT
– SHA-C6: Parallel schedule-round, log-depth ADDER, lower-depth C256NOT
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6.3 Comparison
Toffoli-depth and total number of qubits are carefully estimated for each design.
The number of data qubits α has to be determined at this point. In our numerical
calculation, α = 266 seems to safely achieve the optimal expected iteration
number given by Proposition 3 and to remove the failure probability. Costs
of quantum SHA-256 hashing circuit and the entire Grover’s algorithm on a
single quantum processor is summarized in Table 6. Estimates for single Grover
iteration is omitted from the table as it can easily be calculated from costs of
SHA-256 circuit;
cost(Grover iteration) = 2 · cost(SHA-256)+cost(C256NOT)+cost(C266NOT) .
Table 6. Costs of SHA-256 hashing circuit and entire attack circuit on a single quantum
processor. MAXDEPTH is not considered.
SHA-256 Grover
Toffoli-depth Qubits Toffoli-depth Qubits
SHA-C1 36368 801 1.586 . . .× 2143 802
SHA-C2 13280 853 1.227 . . .× 2142 854
SHA-C3 13280 853 1.163 . . .× 2142 1023
SHA-C4 27584 834 1.216 . . .× 2143 835
SHA-C5 10112 938 1.919 . . .× 2141 939
SHA-C6 10112 938 1.792 . . .× 2141 1023
Table 7. Comparison of trade-offs coefficients of different SHA-256 circuit designs
without the oracle assumption. The smallest cPS# is found by SHA-C6 with c
PS
6 =
1.034 . . .× 238. Other values are divided by cPS6 for easier comparison.
SHA-C1 SHA-C4 SHA-C3 SHA-C2 SHA-C5 SHA-C6
cPS# /c
PS
6 9.830 . . . 6.015 . . . 1.685 . . . 1.565 . . . 1.053 . . . 1
Proposition 4 establishes the criterion for the comparison. Similar to (22),
we replace TPSq and S
PS
q by T PSq and SPSq , respectively, denoting Toffoli-depth
and total number of qubits, i.e.,(T PSq )2 SPSq = cPS# N , (23)
where cPS# varies depending on efficiency of circuits. When parallelized for large
Sq, the expected iteration number converges to the one given in (12). Taking the
converged value, cPS# for each design is summarized in Table 7. If MAXDEPTH
is capped at some fixed value smaller than
√
N , the table indicates that for
example SHA-C1 requires about 9.8. . . times as many qubits as SHA-C6.
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7 Complexity of SHA-256 Collision Finding
Costs of two collision finding algorithms, GwDP and CNS, are to be estimated
in this section. We adopt SHA-C6 which also turn out to be the most efficient
in time-space complexity in GwDP and CNS algorithms6.
7.1 GwDP Algorithm
Estimating the cost of GwDP algorithm is straightforward. Basically this algo-
rithm constructs a set of DPs by running multiple instances of Grover’s algorithm
so that there occurs collision in the set. By using (13), costs of GwDP algorithm
for selected number of machines are summarized in Table 8.
Table 8. Costs of GwDP algorithm for various number of machines. Note that the
algorithm also requires classical memory of size O(Sq).
Sq Toffoli-depth Qubits
22 1.986 . . .× 2141 4084
24 1.985 . . .× 2139 16272
28 1.984 . . .× 2135 258304
216 1.981 . . .× 2127 6.508 . . .× 107
232 1.975 . . .× 2111 4.127 . . .× 1012
264 1.963 . . .× 279 1.732 . . .× 1022
If TGwDPq and S
GwDP
q in Proposition 5 are replaced by Toffoli-depth T GwDPq
and number of qubits SGwDPq , the trade-offs curve reads
T GwDPq SGwDPq = cGwDP ·N
1
2 , (24)
where cGwDP is found to be 1.802 . . .× 225 by using Sq = 264 case.
7.2 CNS Algorithm
Proposition 6 suggests the optimal expected number of iterations in terms of tL.
The only extra work need to be done here is to determine tL explicitly. From
6 Details on circuit comparisons in GwDP and CNS algorithms are dropped from the
main text. An interesting point worth noticing is that SHA-C5 has small advanta-
geous range of Sq(< 2
8) over SHA-C6. The reason is that while SHA-C5 requires
zero additional qubit in hash comparison, SHA-C6 needs (256 − d − 2) qubits in
comparison where d is the number of fixed bits in DP. Since d grows as Sq increases,
there occurs crossover point. It is also noticeable that SHA-C6 cannot exactly fit
into Proposition 5 for the same reason just mentioned, but deviation is small.
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the definition of tL, it reads
tL =
cost(SfL)
2l · cost(G) ,
cost(SfL) = 2 · cost(SHA-256) + 2l · cost
(
C(256−d)NOT
)
,
cost(G) = 2 · cost(SHA-256) + cost (CdNOT)+ cost (C256NOT) ,
l =
d
2
+ log2
(
pi
2tL
)
, d =
⌊
512
5
+
2
5
log2
(
(2tL)
3
pi
)⌉
, (25)
where G is Grover iteration. Numerical approach was taken to find tL, d and
l, which came out to be 0.015182 . . ., 96 and 54.538 . . ., respectively. By sub-
stituting these values for parameters in (14), the expected number of iterations
becomes ICNSrand = 1.856 . . .×2102. Note that this value is somewhat different from
that of Proposition 6 as d has been rounded off. Finally by multiplying ICNSrand
and the time cost of G, we obtain the total Toffoli-depth of CNS algorithm as
ICNSrand · cost(G) = 1.184 . . .× 2117 . (26)
Quantum space cost is cheaper than SHA-C6 because C(256−d)NOT gate used
for list-comparison requires less work qubits than C256NOT in pre-image search.
It is estimated to be 939 qubits in total.
Table 9. Parameter values and costs of CNS algorithm for various number of machines.
Note that the algorithm also requires O(N1/5S
1/5
q ) classical resources.
Sq l d tL Toffoli-depth Qubits
22 55.155 . . . 97 0.015064 . . . 1.353 . . .× 2116 3756
24 55.558 . . . 98 0.014987 . . . 1.203 . . .× 2115 15024
28 56.364 . . . 99 0.014834 . . . 1.729 . . .× 2112 240384
216 57.976 . . . 102 0.014527 . . . 1.960 . . .× 2107 6.154 . . .× 107
232 61.201 . . . 109 0.013914 . . . 1.352 . . .× 298 4.033 . . .× 1012
264 67.654 . . . 121 0.012692 . . . 1.100 . . .× 279 1.732 . . .× 1022
When parallelized, tL slightly changes since l and d depend on Sq(= 2
s), the
number of machines. Modified l and d reads
l =
d
2
+ log2
(
pi
2tL
)
, d =
⌊
512 + 2s
5
+
2
5
log2
(
1.291 . . . (2tL)
3
pi
)⌉
,
where tL, cost(SfL) and cost(G) are the same as in (25). We have estimated the
quantum resource costs of CNS algorithm for a few Sq values as summarized in
Table 9. Note that estimated time complexities are different from ones given by
(15) as the equation is obtained for large Sq, and d here has been rounded off to
the nearest integer. Due to the bound s < min(l, n− d− l), Sq = 266 is almost
the maximum number of quantum machines Proposition 7 holds.
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8 Security Strengths of AES and SHA-2
Based on the results of previous sections, quantum security strengths of AES
and SHA-2 are drawn in this section. Three MAXDEPTH parameters, 240, 264,
and 296, are adopted from [41]. Note that using these values of MAXDEPTH
in our analysis is a conservative approach as our estimates only count Toffoli
gates as time resources whereas NIST has counted all gates. Security strength
of SHA-2 is determined by collision finding problem, not by pre-image search
problem.
Table 10. Trade-offs coefficients of AES-k key search problem for k ∈ {128, 192, 256}
and SHA-m collision finding problem for m ∈ {256, 384, 512}. Coefficients cKSk and c
CF
m
are divided by their respective minimal values cKS128 = c
KS
4 and c
CF
256 = c
GwDP.
AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
cKSk /c
KS
128 1 1.560 . . . 2.586 . . .
SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512
cCFm /c
CF
256 1 3.837 . . . 3.940 . . .
Resource estimates for AES-128 key search problem with circuit AES-C4 is
extended to AES-192 and AES-256, and similarly that of SHA-256 collision find-
ing problem with circuit SHA-C6 is applied to SHA-384 and SHA-512. Since the
depth-qubit trade-offs curves (22) and (24) must holds for larger key and mes-
sage digest sizes, we only compare their trade-offs coefficients in Tables 10. There
is a tendency that the values of coefficients grow as the key or message digest
sizes get larger. Increasing coefficient values reflect various complexity factors
added; more rounds, longer schedule, larger word size, and so on. Especially in
hash, size of the message block in SHA-384 is doubled compared with SHA-256
leading to large gap between cCF256 and c
CF
384. In contrast, c
CF
384 and c
CF
512 do not
show much difference as SHA-384 and SHA-512 algorithms are identical except
truncation and initial values. The result of Sect. 7.2 is also extended to SHA-384
and reflected in Fig. 11.
Once trade-offs coefficients are obtained, we are able to draw the security
strength of each algorithm in terms of required qubits as a function of Toffoli-
depth. Note that somewhere between MAXDEPTH = 264 and 296, security
strengths of SHA-256 (SHA-384) and AES-192 (AES-256) are reversed in order,
due to their different trade-offs curve behaviors. One minor note is that for large
MAXDEPTH (for example, 296), Proposition 2 does not exactly hold since the
size of the domain is larger than that of the codomain in AES-192 and AES-256.
This factor is handled in a conservative way and reflected in Fig. 11.
Figure 11 summarizes the results which can be interpreted as another thresh-
old to be used, for the security strength classification of proposed schemes in
NIST PQC standardization process.
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Toffoli-depth
Q
u
b
it
s
2
96
AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
SHA-384
SHA-256
GwDP
SHA-256
CNS
2
64
2
40
2
40
2
80
2
120
2
160
2
200
2
240
2
280
~2
78
MAXDEPTH
240 264 296
AES-128 281 233 ∗
SHA-256 2114 290 258
AES-192 2145 298 235
SHA-384 2180 2156 2124
AES-256 2210 2162 299
Fig. 11. Security strengths of AES and SHA-2. Values in the table are approximated
number of qubits required to run the respective algorithm for given MAXDEPTH.
9 Summary
Instead of conventional query complexity, we have examined the time-space com-
plexity of Grover’s algorithm and its variants. Three categories of cryptographic
search problems and their characteristics are carefully considered in conjunction
with probabilistic nature of quantum search algorithms.
To relate the time-space complexity with physical quantity, we have proposed
a way of quantifying the computational power of quantum computers. Despite
its simplicity, counting the number of sequential Toffoli gates reflects the reli-
able time complexity in estimating security levels of symmetric cryptosystems.
With simplified cost measure, one can estimate the quantum complexity of a
cryptosystem concisely by counting (and focusing) relevant operations only. It is
worth noting that the above scheme is general for quantum resource estimates
in symmetric cryptanalysis.
The scheme has been applied to resource estimates for AES and SHA-2.
When multiple quantum trade-offs options are given, the time-space complexity
provides clear criteria to tell which is more efficient. Based on the trade-offs
observations made in AES and SHA-2, security strengths of respective systems
are investigated with the MAXDEPTH assumption.
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